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 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
 
____________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
 
                                                                  Petitioner, 
 
-and-                                                                      
               CASE NO. C-6174 
 
COUNTY OF PUTNAM and PUTNAM COUNTY SHERIFF, 
 
                                                                 Employer, 
 
           -and- 
 
PUTNAM COUNTY SHERIFF’S EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
 
                                                                 Intervenor. 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations 
Board, and it appearing that a negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit  and described below, as their 
Certification - C-6174 page 2 
 
 
 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All employees in the titles listed in Article XVII, Section C of the 
agreement between CSEA and the County (see attached), 
emergency services dispatcher, dispatch center shift supervisor, 
and dispatch center supervisor. 
   
         
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO.  The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party.  Such obligation does not compel either 
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED:  July 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
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 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
CAYUGA COMMUNITY COLLEGE PART-TIME 
FACULTY ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, NEA,  
AFL-CIO, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6254 
 
CAYUGA COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
 
                                                 Respondent. 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Cayuga Community College Part-time 
Faculty Association, NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All adjunct faculty. 
Certification - C-6254 - 2 - 
 
 
 
   
   Excluded: All other employees. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Cayuga Community College Part-time Faculty 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO.  The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect 
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party.  Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED:  July 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
 
        
 
                                                                    
 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
 
____________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
EDWIN MOORE, 
 
                                                               Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                          
CASE NO. C-6378 
 
NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY, 
 
                                                              Employer, 
 
           -and- 
 
LOCAL UNION #3, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, 
 
                                                              Intervenor/Incumbent. 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
EDWIN MOORE, for Petitioner 
 
LORI ALESIO, ESQ., for Employer 
 
HARRY GREENBERG, ESQ., for Intervenor 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 
On January 4, 2016, Edwin Moore filed, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition for 
decertification of the Local Union #3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 
the current negotiating representative for employees in the following negotiating unit:   
Included: All regular full-time and part-time Security Officers working at the 
Charles Poletti Power (Poletti facility). 
   
       Excluded: All other employees. 
 
Upon consent of the parties, an election was held on April 22, 2016.  The results 
of the election show that a majority of eligible employees in the unit who cast valid 
ballots no longer desire to be represented for purposes of collective negotiations by the 
intervenor. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor is decertified as the 
negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED:  July 13, 2016  
               Albany, New York 
 
       
  
                                                                 
 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
 
NORTH BABYLON PUBLIC LIBRARY STAFF ASSOCIATION, 
  
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6391 
 
NORTH BABYLON PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
 
                                                 Employer. 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the North Babylon Public Library Staff 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full and part time professional and clerical staff. 
Certification - C-6391 - 2 - 
 
 
 
   
   Excluded: The Library Director, Assistant Director (or Librarian 3 assigned to 
the position), Confidential Secretary to the Director, Bookkeeper, 
Custodial Staff, Pages and Itinerant Substitute Employees. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the North Babylon Public Library Staff Association.  The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party.  Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED:  July 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
 
       
 
 
                                                                    
 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
OPEIU, LOCAL 153, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. CU-6382 
 
LA SALLE ACADEMY, 
 
                                                 Employer. 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the OPEIU, Local 153 has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full-time and regular part-time teachers and guidance 
counselors. 
   
   Excluded: All others (including, but not limited to, the members of the 
Christian Brotherhood). 
Certification - CU-6382 - 2 - 
 
 
 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the OPEIU, Local 153.  The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party.  
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED:  July 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
 
       
 
                                                                    
 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
__________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
LAY FACULTY ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1261, 
L.I.U.N.A,     
 
                                                             Petitioner, 
 
         - and -      
       
                          CASE NO. CU-6386 
 
SACRED HEART ACADEMY, 
 
                                                             Employer. 
__________________________________________ 
 
PAUL AJLOUNCY, ESQ., for Petitioner 
 
RICHARD CEA, ESQ., for Employer 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 
On March 7, 2016, the Lay Faculty Association, Local 1261, L.I.U.N.A  
(petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment 
Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of 
certain employees of the Sacred Heart Academy (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All full-time (3/5 or more) lay teachers and guidance counselors. 
 
Excluded: All others. 
 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on June 10, 2016, 
at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Case No. CU-6386                                                                                                    - 2 - 
 
 
 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective negotiations by the petitioner, the incumbent remains the exclusive 
representative of the unit employees and IT IS ORDERED that the petition is dismissed. 
 
DATED:  July 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
 
       
 
 
  STATE OF NEW YORK  
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
__________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of  
 
CITY OF NEW YORK,   
CASE NO. DR-133 
 
Upon a Petition for a Declaratory Ruling  
___________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of   
 
PATROLMEN’S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK,  
CASE NO. DR-134 
 
Upon a Petition for a Declaratory Ruling  
___________________________________________ 
 
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP (NEIL H. ABRAMSON & DANIEL ALTCHEK of 
counsel), for the City of New York  
 
KAYE SCHOLER LLP (ROBERT GRASS of counsel), for the Patrolmen’s 
Benevolent Association of the City of New York  
 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the City of New York (City) and 
the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc. (PBA) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in a declaratory ruling proceeding, 
finding various proposals submitted for consideration in compulsory interest arbitration 
under § 209 of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) to be mandatory or 
nonmandatory.1 
On November 16, 2015, the arbitration panel issued its award, covering the 
period from August 1, 2010, to July 31, 2012.  Accordingly, we find the instant 
proceeding to be moot, and dismiss the exceptions accordingly. 
The Board has long held that where a proceeding raises solely issues that are 
academic, “we do not consider that the policies of the Act would be served by our 
                                                     
1 48 PERB ¶ 6601 (2015). 
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consideration” of those issues.2  In so holding, the Board explained that “the application 
of a mootness concept is controlled by the particular facts of the case and applied only 
to the extent consistent with the policies of the Act.”3   
In prior cases, the Board has declined to find mootness where the parties’ 
agreement itself reserves the right to seek resolution of outstanding issues, or where 
the pending charge is that a party decided to “cease participating in negotiations 
because it may believe that the other party’s bargaining position constitutes an improper 
practice.”4  Neither ground for our ruling on an otherwise academic case pertains here. 
The Board has held that that “no purpose is served by . . . making a scope 
determination at this time” following the withdrawal of a proposal from interest 
arbitration.5  Courts have similarly found that the parties’ reaching a collective 
bargaining agreement renders moot disputes over terms at issue in the negotiations 
culminating in that agreement.6  Even more directly on point, in a case involving the 
same parties as here, the Appellate Division, Third Department, dismissed as moot a 
challenge to a scope decision still pending after the interest arbitration panel had 
rendered its award.7  
Under the circumstances here, where the panel has issued its award, and 
                                                     
2 City of Peekskill, 26 PERB ¶ 3062, 3109 (1993); see also Town of Wallkill, 43 PERB ¶ 
3026, 3101 (2010), confirmed sub nom Town of Wallkill v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 
44 PERB ¶ 7004 (Sup Ct Alb Co 2011). 
3 Id. 
4 Town of Wallkill, 43 PERB ¶ 3026, at 3101.   
5 City of Buffalo, 23 PERB ¶ 3036, 3073 (1990). 
6 See, e.g., Faculty Assn of Suffolk Cmty College, 125 AD2d 307, 308, 20 PERB ¶ 7002 
(2d Dept 1986) (confirming Suffolk Co. Cmty College, 18 PERB ¶ 3030 (1985)); 
Yonkers Teachers Fedn v Helsby, 8 PERB ¶ 7014 (Sup Ct Alb Co 1975) (confirming Bd 
of Educ of the Yonkers City Sch Dist, 8 PERB ¶ 3020 (1975)). 
7  City of New York v. NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd., 54 AD3d 480, 41 PERB ¶ 7004 (3d 
Dept 2008), lv denied, 12 N.Y.3d 701 (2009). 
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resolved all the issues pending before it, we find that an advisory opinion as to the 
scope of the already-concluded bargaining would not serve to advance the purposes of 
the Act.8   
  IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the parties’ scope petitions must be, and 
hereby are, dismissed in their entirety as moot.    
DATED:    July 13, 2016 
            Albany, New York 
 
   
                                                     
8 The fact that the panel issued its award, resolving all issues between the parties, does 
not bring this matter within any of the three exceptions to the mootness doctrine.  City of 
New York v. NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd., 54 AD3d at 482; see also Hearst 
Corporation v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 715 (1980).  In particular, under City of New York, 
this case does not fit under the exception to the mootness doctrine applicable to matters 
of public importance capable of repetition yet evading review.  As the Court explained in 
that case, “any negotiating party may seek a declaratory ruling or declaratory judgment 
when the proposal is first made, rather than waiting until the parties have reached an 
impasse and proceeded with arbitration, so as to obtain review before the arbitration 
process is complete.”  Id. 
 
Moreover, “[t]he core of the Taylor Law is the policy that governments should negotiate 
with and enter into written agreements with employee organizations representing public 
employees.” City of Mt Vernon, 5 PERB ¶ 3057, 3100 (1972).  Under the circumstances 
here, an after-the-fact advisory opinion as to the efficacy of the parties’ respective 
negotiating strategies could vitiate that core policy by discouraging parties from finding 
their own resolutions at the bargaining table in future negotiations. 
  STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
____________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of    
 
LOCAL 372, DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AFSCME,  
AFL-CIO,  
 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28899 
 
- and - 
 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
 
Respondent. 
____________________________________________ 
 
ROBIN ROACH, GENERAL COUNSEL (JESSE GRIBBEN of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
 
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING (DIMITRIOS J. GOUNELAS of counsel), for Respondent 
 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) finding that the District violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Act (Act).1  The ALJ found that the District impermissibly “unilaterally 
denied parking permits to unit employees, thereby denying them access to free parking” 
without negotiating with Local 372, District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Local 372).2   
EXCEPTIONS 
The District contends that the ALJ erred in not dismissing the case on the basis 
                                            
1 48 PERB ¶ 4554 (2015). 
2 Id. at 4687. 
Case No. U-28899  - 2 – 
that the District did not cause or authorize the changes complained of, nor did it change 
working conditions affecting unit employees.3  The District further asserts that the ALJ 
erred in failing to balance the parties’ case-specific interests and instead found that the 
issuance of a parking permit is a mandatory subject of bargaining in all circumstances.4  
Next, the District argues that the ALJ exceeded her power and authority “in that the 
decision would reverse the City’s governance of its own streets,” and violate public 
policy.5  Finally, the District maintains that the ALJ’s remedial order erred to the extent 
that she did not consider the changed circumstances since the filing of the charge due 
to the collateral litigation resulting from her prior deferral of the matter to arbitration.6 
DISCUSSION 
This is the third case before us arising out of the change at issue, albeit as 
affecting employees in different bargaining units.  Thus, as explained below, the facts as 
stated by the ALJ are, in all material respects, identical to those addressed by the Board 
in Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (“BOE I”).7  
More recently, we followed this decision and the logic of the courts in upholding it, in 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (BOE II).8 
Because the exceptions here are virtually identical to those which have already been 
the subject of two authoritative determinations by the Board and by the courts reviewing 
one of the Board’s prior decisions on this exact subject, we do not address them 
                                            
3 Exceptions Nos. 2.1-2.2. 
4 Exceptions No. 2.3.   
5 Exceptions Nos. 2.5, 2.4.   
6 Exception No. 2.6. 
7 44 PERB ¶ 3003 (2011), confd, City of New York v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 47 
PERB ¶ 7007 (Sup Ct Alb Co 2011) (Zwack, J.), affd, 103 A.D.3d 145, 46 PERB ¶ 7001 
(3d Dept 2012). 
8 49 PERB ¶ 2010 (2016). 
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separately.  To the extent that these prior determinations do not preclude the positions 
asserted by the District, we adhere to our prior decisions and adopt that of the Appellate 
Division, Third Department, as dispositive of the arguments contained in the exceptions 
at issue here. 
As a threshold matter, we note that the District has not excepted to the ALJ’s 
dismissal of its notice of claim defense and its defenses of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel.  Accordingly, those defenses are waived, and not properly before us.9 
As was the case in BOE II, the District has not addressed the ALJ’s reliance in 
her decision on the Board’s prior ruling in BOE I.  In that case, the Board found that the 
District had violated the Act and sustained a charge brought by Local 891, International 
Union of Operating Engineers (Local 891).  The District’s omission of this decision, and 
of the judicial decisions confirming it, is particularly notable in view of the parties’ 
express stipulation before the ALJ that: 
The events leading to the instant Local 372 charge, the 
Local 372 grievances, and the Local 891 charge all stem 
from the same determination regarding distribution of 
parking permits and the distribution of permits was similar for 
employees represented by Local 372 and 891.10 
   
During a subsequent conference, the parties clarified that the Stipulation 
represented their agreement that: 
the practice regarding the issuance of parking permits to 
                                            
9 City University of New York, 48 PERB ¶ 3021, 3071 (2015) (citing Rules of Procedure 
§ 213.2 (b) (4); Village of Endicott, 47 PERB ¶ 3017, 3052, n. 5 (2014)); City of 
Schenectady, 46 PERB ¶ 3025, 3056, at n. 8 (2013), confd sub nom Matter of City of 
Schenectady v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 47 PERB ¶ 7004 (Sup Ct Albany Co 
2014), affd, 136 AD3d 1086 (3d Dept 2016); Town of Orangetown, 40 PERB ¶ 3008 
(2007), confd sub nom Matter of Town of Orangetown v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 
40 PERB ¶ 7008 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2007); Town of Wallkill, 42 PERB ¶ 3006 (2009). 
10 Stipulation of Facts ¶ 30. 
Case No. U-28899  - 4 – 
employees in the unit represented by Local 372 that was in 
effect before the charges in this matter was the same as that 
which was in effect for the employees in the unit represented 
by Local 891 and that that practice is set forth in Local 891, 
Intl Union of Operating (Local 891), 42 PERB ¶ 4568 (2009), 
affd, 44 PERB ¶ 3003 (2011), confirmed sub nom. City of 
New York v New York State Pub Empl Rels Bd, 44 PERB ¶ 
7007 (Sup Ct, Albany County 2011), affd, 103 AD3d 145, 46 
PERB ¶ 7001 (3d Dept 2012).11   
 
Despite this agreement, the District fails to in any way distinguish the claims 
before the ALJ and those the Board and the courts authoritatively determined in BOE I.  
Indeed, the District’s brief in support of its exceptions never mentions BOE I, but, as it 
did in BOE II, rather argues from a mélange of decisions, mostly from the 1970s and 
1980s, that the ALJ: (1) should have found that the District had not effectuated any 
unilateral change, (2) erred in finding that that the parking permits at issue did not 
equate to a free parking space, and thus the ALJ should have conducted an 
independent weighing of the interests of the parties under the facts at issue; and (3) 
exceeded her jurisdiction and issued a ruling that violated public policy by infringing on 
the interests of the City of New York.12  The Board and the courts have already 
considered each of these claims in BOE I and rejected them.13    
As the sole respondent before the Board in BOE I, and the only petitioner 
recognized to have a cognizable interest before the courts in the subsequent 
                                            
11 48 PERB ¶ 4554, at 4691, n. 10 (quoting ALJ Letter, February 12, 2015).    
12 Brief in Support of Exceptions at pp 5-10; 10-13; 13-16. 
13 BOE I, 44 PERB ¶ 3003, at 3031-3033 (Board decision); City of New York, 44 PERB 
¶ 7007, at 7013-7014 (Supreme Court decision); City of New York, 103 AD3d at 149-
152, 46 PERB ¶ 7001, at 7002-7005.  Since the filing of the exceptions, of course, the 
Board has reaffirmed these holdings in BOE II. 
proceedings under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules,14 the District clearly 
was a party to those matters and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues, 
so that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the District from contesting the 
material facts and legal issues necessarily decided adverse to it in those proceedings.15  
Moreover, even if we were to find that collateral estoppel did not apply to the 
facts and legal issues actually determined by our decision and those of the courts in 
BOE I, those cases are governing precedent which the District never even attempted to 
address or distinguish.  Rather, the District has treated this matter as if there were no 
binding precedent construing the Act and expressly governing the issues here, instead 
arguing solely from general principles.  Accordingly, we find that the District has 
proffered no reason for us to vary from our decision in BOE I, especially in light of the 
Appellate Division’s binding and authoritative findings as to the identical claims raised 
by the District in objecting to that decision.  In BOE II we adopted the Appellate 
Division’s rejection of the claims pursued in the exceptions.  We reaffirm and adhere to 
those rulings today.16   
                                            
14 Supreme Court found that “[t]he City of New York was not a party to the 
administrative process [before PERB] and pursuant to statute has no standing to bring 
this proceeding,” and thus dismissed the City’s petition, leaving the District as the only 
petitioner.  City of New York, 44 PERB ¶ 7007, at 7013.  The Appellate Division affirmed 
Supreme Court’s holding on that point.  City of New York, 103 AD3d at 149, 46 PERB ¶ 
7001, at 7002. 
15 Collateral estoppel applies where “(1) the issue sought to be precluded is identical to 
a material issue necessarily decided by the administrative agency in a prior proceeding; 
and (2) there was a full and fair opportunity to contest this issue in the administrative 
tribunal.”  Jeffreys v Griffin, 1 N.Y.3d 34, 39 (2003); Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 
449, 455-456 (finding collateral estoppel applicable to subsequent suit against tortfeasor 
brought by unrelated plaintiff); Vega v Metro Trans Auth, 133 AD3d 518, 519 (1st Dept 
2015) (following Kaufman). 
16 49 PERB ¶ 2010, text at n. 16 (adopting reasoning and holding of City of New 
York,107 AD3d at 149-152, 46 PERB ¶ 7001, at 7003-7005).   
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 Accordingly, we affirm the decision and order of the ALJ.  
 IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District will forthwith: 
 
1. Make available to Local 372 unit employees free parking, upon request, on a first 
come, first served basis, as was available before the fall of 2008; 
 
2. Make whole, with interest at the maximum legal rate, Local 372 bargaining unit 
members who, upon a showing of reasonable documentary evidence and/or 
affidavits, incurred parking expenses that they would not have incurred but for the 
elimination of the availability of free parking on a first come, first served basis from 
September 2008 until the free parking benefit provided by paragraph 1 is restored;  
 
3. Negotiate, upon Local 372’s demand, with Local 372 regarding the availability of free 
parking for members of the Local 372 bargaining unit; and 
 
4. Sign and post the attached notice below at all physical and electronic locations 
customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
 
DATED:    July 13, 2016 
       Albany, New York 
 
 
     
  
 NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
 
we hereby notify all employees of the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New 
York (District) in the unit represented by the Local 372, District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Local 
372) that the District will forthwith:   
 
1. Make available to Local 372 unit employees free parking, upon request, on a 
first come, first served basis, as was available before the fall of 2008; 
 
2. Make whole Local 372 bargaining unit members who, upon a showing of 
reasonable documentary evidence and/or affidavits, incurred parking 
expenses that they would not have incurred but for the elimination of the 
availability of free parking on a first come, first served basis from the fall of 
2008 until the free parking benefit provided by paragraph 1 is restored; and 
 
3. Negotiate, upon Local 372’s demand, with Local 372 regarding the availability 
of free parking for members of the Local 372 bargaining unit. 
  
 
 
Dated . . . . . . . . . .  By  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
on behalf of the Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York  
   
 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.  
 
  STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
_______________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
TOWN OF ULSTER POLICEMEN’S 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
 
Charging Party, 
 
-and-             
       CASE NO. U-32984 
 
TOWN OF ULSTER, 
     
Respondent. 
_______________________________________________ 
     
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
 
ROEMER WALLENS GOLD & MINEAUX LLP (WILLIAM M. WALLENS 
of counsel), for Respondent 
 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Ulster (Town) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that that the Town violated  
§§ 209-a.1 (d) and (e) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act).1   The ALJ 
found that the Town violated the Act when it informed the Town of Ulster Policemen’s 
Benevolent Association (PBA) that it would be unilaterally implementing a newly 
enacted local law which created a new disciplinary procedure applicable to civilian 
dispatchers in the PBA’s bargaining unit.  For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
EXCEPTIONS 
 The Town excepts to the ALJ’s ruling on three bases.  First, the Town contends 
                                            
1 48 PERB ¶ 4507 (2015). The ALJ dismissed the claim that the Town had violated  
§ 209-a.1 (a) of the Act. 
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that the ALJ erred in finding the disciplinary procedures pertaining to civilian dispatchers 
within the bargaining unit are a mandatory subject of bargaining, on the ground that 
pursuant to Town Law §§ 154 and 155, the subject of discipline is prohibited as to 
“members” of a police department, whether civilian or those performing police functions.  
The Town further asserts that the ALJ erred in applying the Board’s recent decision in 
Town of Ulster, which was under review in judicial proceedings pursuant to Article 78 of 
the Civil Practice Law and Rules.2  Finally, the Town contends that, as the subject is a 
prohibited one, the ALJ erred in finding that the Town’s failure to continue the expired 
contractual provisions relating to discipline of civilian dispatchers violated § 209-a.1 (e) 
of the Act.  The PBA cross-excepted to the ALJ’s dismissal of its claim that the Town 
violated § 209-a.1 (a) on the ground that the Town’s refusal to continue the relevant 
terms of the expired contact was based on a colorable reading of the law.  
DISCUSSION 
      The facts are set forth in the ALJ’s decision, and are not contested in any way 
relevant to resolving the issues posed by the exceptions.   As the Town correctly notes, 
this case raises the same legal issue decided in our prior case involving a single civilian 
dispatcher whose disciplinary interview was, in a unilateral change to procedure, tape 
recorded.3  After canvassing the case law, the statutory language of the relevant 
sections of the Town Law, the legislative history, and parallel usage in similar statutory 
provisions, the Board found that: 
Throughout the Court [of Appeals’s] decisions in this regard, 
it has only found “police discipline” to be precluded where 
“the legislation discloses a legislative intent and public policy 
                                            
2 47 PERB ¶ 3028 (2014), confd sub nom Town of Ulster v NYS Pub Empl Relations 
Bd,  Index No. 403-15 (Sup Ct Alb Co March 24, 2016) (O’Connor, J.). 
3 Id. at 3084. 
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to leave the disciplining of police officers to the discretion of 
the Police Commissioner,” and has, in so doing, 
“emphasized the quasi-military nature of a police force.”  
Neither the legislative intent, nor the special nature of police 
officers’ work at issue in those cases is at issue here, and 
therefore we find that the public policy exclusion of police 
discipline from collective bargaining does not apply to civilian 
employees working in town police departments in non-police 
officer functions.4 
 
 In rejecting the Town’s challenge to the Board’s decision, the Supreme Court, 
Albany County “recognize[d] that it owe[d] no deference to PERB’s interpretation of the 
Town Law in this circumstance,” but nonetheless found that the Board “properly held 
that the term ‘member’ or ‘members’ of a police department in Town Law § 155 were 
intended to refer to police officers, not civilians employed in a police department.”5  
Accordingly, the Court confirmed the Board’s holding that disciplinary procedures 
applicable to such civilian employees were mandatory subjects of bargaining, and that a 
unilateral change to such procedures violated the Act.6 
 We adhere to the decision in Town of Ulster, for the reasons stated in that 
decision, and in the Court’s decision confirming it, and thus reject the Town’s argument 
that the ALJ erred in following it.  Nor do we find persuasive the argument that the ALJ 
erred in following the Board’s decision during the pendency of the Article 78 proceeding 
challenging its validity.  The mere fact of a party’s filing an Article 78 challenge to a 
Board decision does not preclude an ALJ, who necessarily looks to the Board’s 
                                            
4 47 PERB ¶ 3028, at 3086 (footnote omitted) (citing Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn of 
the City of NY, Inc. v NYS Pub Empl Relation Bd, 6 NY3d 563, 575-576 (2006); see 
also id. at 3085-3086. 
5 Town of Ulster v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, Index No. 403-15, at 27; see also id at 
27-30.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court followed not only the decisions of the 
Court of Appeals, but, in “applying the principles of statutory construction” as well as 
“the legislative history of that section [Town Law § 155], the provisions of Article Ten of 
the Town Law as a whole, and parallel provisions of similar statutes.”  Id.  
6 Id. at 29-32. 
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decisions as enunciating the governing law, from relying on that decision.7  Likewise, as 
we find that the subject of discipline of civilian employees in the Town Police 
Department is not prohibited but rather mandatory, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that the 
Town violated § 209-a.1 (e) of the Act by failing to continue the disciplinary provisions of 
the expired contract applicable to civilian dispatchers. 
 Finally, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that the Town did not violate § 209-a.1 (a) of 
the Act by repudiating the portions of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement at 
issue.  As we have previously found, in not dissimilar circumstances, a mistaken but not 
clearly foreclosed interpretation of an authoritative text may constitute 
a colorable claim of right premised on external law sufficient to rebut a repudiation 
claim.8  In this case of first impression, as in Town of Wallkill, we find that the Town’s 
position, while unpersuasive on the merits, was not so lacking in merit as to ground a 
repudiation claim.  
 Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s decision.  
 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Town   
1. Cease and desist from applying Local Law No. 2 to civilian dispatchers in the 
PBA’s bargaining unit; 
2. Destroy any records created as a result of the application of Local Law No. 2 to 
civilian dispatchers in the PBA’s bargaining unit;  
                                            
7 While not strictly applicable to these circumstances, we note that a pending appeal 
does not deprive a decision of the requisite finality to have preclusive effect.  See, eg, 
Sobenis v Harridge House Assocs of 1984, 45 Misc3d 1216(A), 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 
51603(U) (Sup Ct Kings Co. Oct. 8, 2014) (law of the 
case);  Anonymous v.Dobbs Ferry Union Free School Dist., 19 AD3d 522, 522–
523 (2d Dept 2005) (same; collateral estoppel). 
8 Town of Wallkill, 42 PERB ¶ 3017, (2009), abrogated on other grounds by Town of 
Wallkill, 19 NY3d 1066 (2012).  
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3. Make civilian dispatchers whole for any loss of wages or benefits resulting from 
the application of Local Law No. 2, with interest at the maximum legal rate; and 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations 
customarily used to post notices to unit employees.  
DATED:  July 13, 2016 
       Albany, New York 
 
       
 
 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
 
We hereby notify all employees of the Town of Ulster (Town) in the bargaining unit 
represented by the Town of Ulster Policemen’s Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) that 
the Town will:  
 
1. Not apply Local Law No. 2 to civilian dispatchers in the PBA’s bargaining unit; 
 
2. Destroy any records created as a result of the application of Local Law No. 2 to 
civilian dispatchers in the PBA’s bargaining unit; and 
 
3. Make civilian dispatchers whole for any loss of wages or benefits resulting from 
the application of Local Law No. 2, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
 
 
 
Dated . . . . . . . . . .                      By  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                                                     
              on behalf of Town of Ulster                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  
 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
 must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.  
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Richard Josey to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his improper practice charge alleging that 
the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFL-CIO, Local 401 (CSEA) 
violated § 209-a.2 (c) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) by declining 
to pursue a grievance arising from Josey’s termination as a probationary employee.1  
The ALJ dismissed the charge on the grounds that Josey: (1) failed to attend a case 
conference scheduled by agreement between the parties and confirmed by letter, and 
                                                     
1 48 PERB ¶ 4611 (2015). 
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(2) did not reply to a subsequent voicemail message and a letter giving him the 
opportunity to provide a sworn statement explaining his failure to appear.2 
By agreement of the parties, the ALJ scheduled a case conference for August 
13, 2015, as confirmed in a July 23, 2015 letter from the ALJ, which informed Josey 
“that the failure to appear at the conference may constitute a basis for dismissal of the 
absent party’s pleading.”3  Josey did not request an adjournment of the conference. 
On August 13, 2015, CSEA and the State timely appeared for the conference.  
When Josey did not timely appear, PERB staff called him, and he stated that he would 
appear shortly.  Josey did not appear that day, nor did he answer further calls from 
PERB staff, including a voicemail message later that day asking him to contact PERB 
regarding his non-appearance.  CSEA and the State subsequently moved to dismiss the 
charge based upon his failure to appear. In an August 14, 2015 letter, the ALJ informed 
Josey of the motions, and gave him until August 22 to file a sworn statement providing 
“good and sufficient reason” for his non-appearance.  The August 14 letter further stated 
that “failure to file a sworn statement by the required date could serve as an additional 
basis for the dismissal of his charge.”4  Josey did not respond to the letter. 
In his exceptions, Josey admits receiving the call and telling PERB staff that he 
would appear on August 13, but then states that “due to my [fiancée’s] pregnancy and 
health issues, I could not appear.”  He denies having received the August14, 2015 letter 
from the ALJ, and states that “I still wish to pursue the charge and I wish for an appeal.”  
                                                     
2 Id at 4909. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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No further grounds for exception are provided. 
Pursuant to § 212.2 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), “[t]he failure of a party to 
appear at the conference may, in the discretion of the administrative law judge, 
constitute ground for dismissal of the absent party's pleading.”5  Thus, “[u]nless the 
ALJ's dismissal of the charge evidences an abuse of discretion based on the record 
before the ALJ, there is no basis to reverse the decision.”6  We find that the ALJ did not 
abuse her discretion in dismissing the charge under the circumstances presented to 
her.     
Here, as in Smithtown Fire District and Jouldach, Josey claims not to have 
received the ALJ’s April 14 letter; as in those cases, the mailing of the ALJ’s letter and 
of the motions to dismiss (which Josey does not deny having received in his exceptions) 
was made in regular course to Josey’s address as provided by him, and no grounds 
exist to suggest that all three documents were not delivered.7   
Moreover, even if we assume that Josey did not receive the August 14 letter, his 
conduct remains unexcused.  The ALJ’s July 23 letter confirming the conference date 
made clear that the failure to appear at the conference “may constitute a basis for 
dismissal of the absent party’s pleading.”  Despite this warning, Josey did not respond 
to the calls from PERB when he did not arrive for the conference after having told staff 
that he was coming, albeit late.  Josey took no steps to seek another opportunity for the 
                                                     
5 See generally UFT (Simpson Gray), 42 PERB ¶ 3011 (2009), confd, Gray v United 
Fedn of Teachers, 43 PERB ¶ 7004 (Sup Ct NY Co. 2010).  
6 Smithtown Fire Dist, 28 PERB ¶ 3060, 3135 (1995); see also IBT, L. 237 (Jouldach), 
34 PERB ¶ 3009, 3018 (2001). 
7 Smithtown Fire Dist, 28 PERB ¶ 3060, at 3135; Jouldach, 34 PERB ¶ 3009, at 3020. 
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conference to take place, or to provide the ALJ and counsel to the parties with an 
explanation, let alone an excuse, for his failure to appear.8   
We do not consider the excuse proffered now by Josey.  Josey did not raise 
before the ALJ any issue with respect to his fiancée’s health or other reason why he 
could not be present; he did not claim that urgent circumstances prevented his 
attendance or required an adjournment, either on August 13 or subsequently.  As the 
Board explained in Smithtown Fire District, “we will not consider allegations of fact made 
for the first time in exceptions when reviewing an ALJ's decision because our review is 
limited to the record as it was developed before the ALJ,” especially where, as here, the 
question is whether the ALJ abused her discretion, a determination inherently limited to 
the record before her.9 We, therefore, deny the exceptions filed by Josey and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED:    July 13, 2016 
            Albany, New York 
       
                                                     
8 Id. 
9 28 PERB ¶ 3060, at 3135. 
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 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by Brian Burke to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his improper practice charge against his 
employer, New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA).1  Based on the allegations in the 
amended charge, discussions at a pre-hearing conference, and an offer of proof that 
Burke filed in support of his allegations, the ALJ held that Burke’s allegations, if proved, 
would not establish a prima facie violation of §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act).   
 Burke alleges in his exceptions that the ALJ mischaracterized the facts in his 
offer of proof and erroneously concluded that those facts failed to reveal a prima facie 
violation of the Act. NYCTA filed a response in support of the ALJ’s description of the 
facts and her conclusion of law.  Burke filed a reply to NYCTA’s response, without 
                                                     
1 48 PERB ¶ 4604 (2015). 
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2 
seeking authorization to do so under § 213.3 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules).2  
Because Burke did not seek permission to file a reply, and because NYCTA’s response 
to Burke’s exceptions did not raise material issues for the first time as to warrant the 
filing of a reply, we do not address or consider the allegations in his reply.3  For the 
reasons given below, we affirm the ALJ’s decision. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANT FACTS 
Burke’s amended improper practice charge alleges that NYCTA violated §§209-
a.1 (a) and (c)4 of the Act by comments made in a newspaper article and by withholding 
his wages, sick leave, vacation time, and overtime.  NYCTA filed an answer denying 
that it violated the Act and asserting a number of defenses.  At a pre-hearing 
conference, after Burke’s statement of his case, NYCTA moved to dismiss the charge 
for its failure to present a prima facie claim.  Following the conference, Burke filed an 
                                                     
2 “No pleading other than exceptions, cross-exceptions or a response thereto will be 
accepted or considered by the board unless it is requested by the board or filed with the 
board's authorization. Such additional pleadings will not be requested or authorized by 
the board unless the preceding pleading properly raises issues which are material to the 
disposition of the matter for the first time. If any additional pleading is requested or 
authorized by the board, the board shall notify the parties regarding the conditions 
under which that pleading will be permitted.” 
3 Id.   
4 A claim under §209-a.1(d) of the Act was not processed based on lack of standing.  
Because Burke did not except to that portion of the ALJ’s decision, any objection to that 
ruling has been waived and is not properly before us.  City University of New York, 48 
PERB ¶ 3021, 3071 (2015) (citing Rules § 213.2 (b) (4)); Village of Endicott, 47 PERB ¶ 
3017, 3052, n. 5 (2014)); City of Schenectady, 46 PERB ¶ 3025, 3056, at n. 8 
(2013), confd sub nom Matter of City of Schenectady v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 47 
PERB ¶ 7004 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2014), affd, 136 AD3d 1086 (3d Dept 2016); Town of 
Orangetown, 40 PERB ¶3008 (2007), confd sub nom Matter of Town of Orangetown v 
NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 40 PERB ¶ 7008 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2007); Town of 
Wallkill, 42 PERB ¶ 3006 (2009).  Likewise, Burke has not excepted to the ALJ’s denial 
of his motion to dismiss the NYCTA’s answer as untimely, on the ground that the late 
filing was a result of attorney error and did not prejudice Burke.  Any such exception has 
been waived and is not properly before us.  Id.  
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offer of proof in support of his charge and a brief in opposition to NYCTA’s motion.  
NYCTA filed a brief in support of its motion. 
Burke is a 14-year employee of NYCTA, working most of that time as a train 
operator.  He is also a Transit Workers Union, Local 100 (TWU) shop steward.  In April 
2014 he was demoted to station-agent trainee as the result of alleged safety violations.5  
 Burke had filed improper practice charges against NYCTA in 2007 and in 
February 2014.  On March 20, 2015, he also filed a federal lawsuit against NYCTA 
seeking back pay and unspecified damages.   
 In his current improper practice charge, Burke claims retaliation by NYCTA for 
his prior improper practice proceedings.6  He asserts that the retaliation came in the 
form of a derogatory article in the New York Post and NYCTA’s withholding of pay and 
benefits “in an attempt to drive this whistleblower into poverty.”  He also claims that 
“unknown supervision and management” referred to him at a learning center as a “Train 
Kook.”    
 The March 29, 2015 Post article, attached to Burke’s charge, is headlined: 
“‘Satanic MTA out to kill’ Train kook’s claim.”  It begins, “It’s the D train, as in devil.”  The 
article reports that Burke filed a lawsuit in federal court against NYCTA that accuses 
NYCTA of engaging in “satanic terroristic criminality” by sending bosses to “terrorize” 
and “assault” him.  According to the article, Burke alleged in his lawsuit that NYCTA has 
                                                     
5 NYCTA inspectors allegedly entered his train to check if he was wearing corrective 
lenses.  The visit was reportedly prompted by Burke’s refusal to remove tinted glasses 
at a 2014 PERB hearing.  
6 He also claims “direct violation of NYCTA Department of Law policy and NYCTA 
Rules,” both of which are beyond our jurisdiction. 
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intended to “endanger every soul on the train and on the track” when, in April 2014, its 
inspector “entered his train to see whether he was wearing corrective lenses.”  The 
article further reports that Burke explained that the electricity on the tracks and the 
weight of trains create an “infinite way to be murdered or suicided” [sic].  It quotes 
Burke’s lawsuit as stating that he believes he may be in “mortal danger” and that his 
employer “may be more dangerous” than “the mob.”  The article reports: “Transit 
sources say his previous wacky claims have been shot down by courts or the Public 
Employee [sic] Relations Board.”   Finally, the article reports that Burke has called 
NYCTA “the Invisible Empire” and likened it to the “KKK.” 
 At no point does the article identify any of its sources.  However, Burke told the 
ALJ at the pre-hearing conference that he was contacted by a reporter before the article 
was published and spoke to that person for 27 minutes.  The ALJ surmised that the 
Post obtained its material from reviewing Burke’s federal complaint.  There is no basis 
to conclude that NYCTA had anything to do with the publication of the article.   
 According to Burke, the article caused him to suffer a “panic attack.”  He alleges 
that as a result of his panic attack, he has been out of work on Worker’s Compensation 
since the publication of the article.  Burke claims that NYCTA is challenging his 
entitlement to Workers Compensation benefits.  He further claims that the author of the 
article violated his civil rights and retaliated against him for his prior PERB cases “and 
other whistleblowing activity.”7  Burke also contends that NYCTA “published” the piece 
in the Post and distributed it online.   
                                                     
7 This was Burke’s statement at the PERB conference when he was asked to explain 
the basis for his charge. 
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In specifying who within NYCTA he believed was responsible for the article, he 
pointed to attorney Kristen Nolan, who handled the 2007 PERB case, which was 
settled, and is the attorney assigned to the present charge.  In an October 19, 2015 
letter to the ALJ, Burke opined: 
The charges against the Respondent are clear, that in 
retaliation for protected activity by the Charging Party, one or 
more attorneys at the NYCTA Department of Law, 
presumably Ms. Nolan, gave false information to the New 
York Post characterizing Respondent as a “Train kook” etc.8 
 
In his charge, however, Burke states outright that Nolan “wrote and/or had published a 
false malicious slanderous defamatory hit piece.”  He also asserts that it was 
“disseminated at the workplace, online at MTA Today Facebook and throughout the 
Transit system” without identifying by whom.  He said that his supervisor brought a copy 
of the article to him and that “apparently someone from the supervisor’s office posted it.”  
An amendment to the charge, in response to a deficiency notice, however, asserts that 
Nolan was responsible for the article’s distribution online and at NYCTA’s work sites.  
No basis for that conclusion is provided.   
Burke’s theory of the case is further confused by reference in his October 19, 
2015 letter to the ALJ, stating: 
The New York Post, in their motion to dismiss, 
acknowledged that it was a NYCTA attorney who gave the 
what they acknowledge now is false information [sic].9 
 
However, the only motion to dismiss that is pending before PERB is that filed by 
NYCTA; the New York Post is not a party to the instant proceeding.  This was pointed 
                                                     
8 Response to Exceptions, Ex F. 
9 Id. 
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out to Burke in a letter from the ALJ dated October 26, 2015, to which he did not 
respond.  No papers from another legal action involving the newspaper have been 
presented. 
 As for Burke’s claim of NYCTA’s retaliatory withholding of his wages and 
benefits, no information was presented to the ALJ other than a statement of the 
amounts that were allegedly withheld and his conclusory assertion that the withholding 
was “in retaliation and a successful attempt to drive this whistle-blower into poverty.”10  
It appears from the papers that the wages and benefits were stopped pending the 
outcome of the Worker’s Compensation claim that NYCTA appears to be contesting. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ accurately recounted Burke’s allegations and the basis for his claim that 
NYCTA violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c).  Moreover, although there is no written 
documentation of the discussion at the pre-hearing conference on which the ALJ relied, 
Burke’s exceptions are not inconsistent with the ALJ’s recitation of those discussions.   
In UFT (Jenkins),11 the Board reaffirmed the settled test applicable to a charge 
such as this.   
It is well-established that a charging party in an improper 
practice charge alleging unlawfully motivated interference or 
discrimination in violation of §§ 209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act 
has the burden of proof to demonstrate by a preponderance 
of evidence that: a) the affected individual engaged in 
protected activity under the Act; b) such activity was known 
                                                     
10 Burke’s letter to the ALJ dated October 19, 2015.  In his brief in opposition to the 
motion, Burke also cites, at p. 2, the “Wage Theft Prevention Act Section 195 of the 
NYS Labor Law.”  The ALJ correctly observed that our jurisdiction extends only to the 
Act, and not to any statute other than the Act. 
11 41 PERB ¶ 3007 (2008), confirmed sub nom. Jenkins v. New York State Pub Empl 
Relations Bd, 41 PERB ¶ 7007 (Sup Ct NY County 2008). 
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to the person or persons taking the employment action; and 
c) the employment action would not have been taken “but 
for” the protected activity.12 
 
There, the Board emphasized that proof of a prima facie case of improperly motivated 
action can be established with direct or circumstantial evidence, observing: 
At minimum, the circumstantial evidence necessary to prove 
a prima facie case must be sufficient to give rise to an 
inference that unlawfully motivated interference or 
discrimination was a factor in the employer's conduct. This 
relatively low initial evidentiary threshold for establishing a 
prima facie case in circumstantial evidence cases is 
necessitated by the principles underlying §§ 209-a.1(a) and 
(c) of the Act along with the lack of discovery and the 
pleading requirements under our Rules of Procedure 
(Rules). Although the timing and the context of events alone 
in a circumstantial evidence case may not be sufficient to 
meet a charging party's ultimate burden of proof, the timing 
and context of an employer's conduct may be sufficient to 
establish an inference of improper motivation, thereby 
shifting the burden of persuasion to the respondent to come 
forward with evidence demonstrating a non-discriminatory 
basis for the alleged conduct.13   
 
 Here, we find that the facts alleged in Burke’s improper practice charge, as 
amended, and clarified at the pre-hearing conference, and augmented by his offer of 
proof, do not make out a circumstantial prima facie case of a violation of §§ 209-a.1 (a) 
or (c) of the Act.  At its heart, the charge and offer of proof complain of the article 
published in the New York Post.  Burke’s offer of proof and his allegations are devoid of 
any basis upon which a reasonable inference can be drawn that NYCTA was 
responsible for that publication.  Moreover, there is nothing in any of Burke’s pleadings 
that tends to establish that NYCTA retaliated against Burke by withholding wages and 
                                                     
12 41 PERB ¶ 3007 at 3043. 
13 Id. 
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benefits because he filed his two prior improper practice charges.  Based on the 
pleadings before us, we agree with the ALJ that the simple allegation that the 
withholding of Burke’s wages and benefits followed the filing of his prior charges is an 
insufficient basis to require NYCTA to come forward with a defense to the charge.14   
 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the ALJ and dismiss Burke’s improper 
practice charge.  
DATED:  July 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
            
  
       
 
                                                     
14 See, eg, State of New York (SUNY Buffalo), 33 PERB ¶ 3020 (2000). 
